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STuDENT NoES
late marriage, and should specify by statute just who may marry and
Just at what age marriage may be contracted. The law has always
deemed infants to be affected with an imbecility of judgment, and for
that reason, incapable of giving their consent to marry before they
reached a certain age. Child marriages militate against the proper
education and culture of youth; and because most boys and girls are
of innate unstable disposition, early marriages are frequently condu-
cive to unhappiness for both parties throughout life. It is to obviate
these conditions that statutes have been enacted requiring a relatively
mature age before the marriage union may be entered. Without doubt
such statutes were designed primarily to protect adolescent boys and
girls from the precipitancy of their own injudicious acts when con-
templating the marriage relation. But regardless of the undesirability
of child marriages, if the only disability is nonage, it does not require
the astuteness of a philosopher to apprehend that, once the marriage
has been consummated, courts will go a long way in lending validity
to such marriage since the parties could never assume their original
status. Public policy and the importance of the martial status itself
dictate such a procedure.
To summarize, the writer submits that the following propositions
represent the law In Kentucky:
1. The marriage of a boy under sixteen or of a girl under four-
teen would be perfectly valid if ratified by cohabitation after reach-
ing those ages, although parental consent to the initial marriage was
not obtained.
2. The marriage of a boy, under sixteen or of a girl under four-
teen is not void, but is voidable only, and is valid for all civil purposes
until annulled by a proper judicial pronouncement.
TowN HALL.
WILLS-ADVANCEMENTS.
An advancement is a gift from a parent, or one who stands in
loco parentis, to a child, which is to be charged to the child in the
distribution of the parent's estate. Such gifts are usually made for
the purpose of establishing or "advancing" the child in life. When
so made it is unnecessary to present evidence that the parent intend-
ed the gift to be charged. The intent is presumed.
The doctrine of charging children with gifts from their parents
in the settlement of the estate of the parents is of ancient origin. As
might be surmised, It is designated to place all of the children on an
equal footing and to prevent an undue preference of those who receive
substantial gifts during the lifetime of the parents.
Strictly speaking, an advancement can exist only where the par-
ent dies wholly or partially intestate. By analogy, however, the prin-
ciple has been extended to cover gifts made after the execution of a
will in which the children are named as devisees or legatees. It also
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applies to gifts made prior to the execution of a will, if the will shows
an intention on the part of the testator to charge the children with
such gifts.
More than two centuries ago, it was agreed to be the constant
rule "that where a legacy was given to a child, who afterwards upon
marriage or otherwise had the like or a greater sum, it should be In-
tended in satisfaction of the legacy, unless the testator should declare
his intent to be otherwise."' A gift of a smaller amount is likewise
presumed to be a pro tanto satisfaction of a legacy to a child. The
charging of a gift to a child's legacy, when it would not be charged if
the legacy were to another, may appear unreasonable and has been
criticized by eminent law-writers. It is founded, however, on the
equitable rule against double portions.2
If an advancement should exceed the portion due the child, he Is
under no obligation to repay the difference. To this extent it differs
from a debt, which must be paid even though greater than the child's
share of the estate. Unless specifically charged, an advancement does
not bear interest, while a debt does. On the other hand, advance-
ments are not barred by the statute of limitations, or by a release in
bankruptcy, as in the case of debts. An advancement differs from a
gift In that the latter is not chargeable to the parent's estate.
Children who have received advancements must bring the value of
their gifts into "hotchpot" with the undevised estate of their parent
before they can share therein. The hotchpot rule may be illustrated
thus: P dies leaving three children, A, B and Q, and an undevised es-
tate of $6,000, after having made advancements of $2,000 to A and $1,-
000 to B. Adding the advancements to the remaining estate gives a
total of $9,000, or $3,000 for each of the children. Deducting the ad-
vancements made to A and B, the remaining shares would be: A, $1,-
000; B, $2,000; and 0, $3,000. Without the law of advancements, the
undevised estate would be divided equally between the three children.
Small gifts or gifts for support, maintenance or primary educa-
tion are not considered advancements, in the absence of specific evi-
dence of intention.
The common law rule with respect to advancements has been In-
corporated In Section 1407 of the Kentucky statutes, which reads as
follows:
".Any real or personal property or money, given or devised
by a parent or grandparent, to a descendant, shall be charged to
the descendant or those claiming through him in the division and
distribution of the undevised estate of the parent or grandparent;
and such party shall receive nothing further therefrom until the
other descendants are made proportionately equal with him, ac-
cording to his descendable and distributable share of the whole
estate, real and personal, devised and undevised. The advance-
ment shall be estimated according to the value of, the property
1Izard v. Hurat, Freem, C. C. 224 (1697).
2Carmichael v. Lathtrop, 108 Mich. 473, 66 N. W. 350 (1896).
STUDENT Nom-
when given. The maintaining or educating, or the giving of money
to a child or grandchild, without any view to a portion or settle-
ment in life, shall not be deemed an advancement."
It will be noted that the above quoted statute treats only of ad-
vancements where the decedent dies wholly or partially intestate. In
another statute, Section 4840, the deduction of advancements made
subsequent to the execution of a will is provided for. Section 4840 is
quoted below:
"A provision for or advancement to any person shall be deemed
a satisfaction in whole or in part of a devise or bequest to such
person contained in a previous will, if it would be so deemed -in
case the devisee or legatee were the child of the testator; and
whether he is a child or not, it shall be so deemed in all cases in
which it shall appear from parol or other evidence to have been
so intended."
In G luey v. LilarZ's Bxecutor, it was held that gifts made before
the will and not charged therein, can be charged as advancements
only in the distribution of the undevised estate.
One of the principal problems in connection with this subject is
to determine what gifts or conveyances shall be regarded as advance-
ments, and therefore chargeable to the child. In Brannock v. HamiT-
ton," payments for primary education of which, no account was kept
were held to be not chargeable as advancements. But in Hill v. Hill,"
payments for a professional education, which were included in an
account kept by the parent against the child, were designated advance-
ments. Gifts of savings accounts by father to children were held to
be advancements in Collins v. Collins' administrator.8
In Sullivan v. Sullivan,' the court said: "A person may by will
dispose of his estate, and thus regulate the matter of advancements
between the children, whether the advancements have in fact been
made or not. But, if a person dies intestate, then the question is
regulated by the statute (Section 1407), and the declaration or inten-
tion of the parent cannot control the fact."
From the above it would appear that the Kentucky law respecting
advancements may be summarized briefly as follows:
1-WMREa THERE Is No WnL-
(a) Gifts from a parent (or grandparent) to a child will
be presumed to be advancements and charged to the child's por-
tion of the parent's estate. This rule also applies to the undevised
portion of the estate in the case of partial intestacy.
(b) Small gifts, or gifts for support, maintenance or pri-
mary education are not advancements.
3 145 Ky. 746, 141 S. W. 37 (1911).
'9 Bush 446 (Ky. 1872).
5122 Ky. 681, 92 S. W. 924 (1906).
4242 Ky. 5, 45 S. W. (2d) 811 (1931).
'122 Ky. 707, 92 S. W. 966 (1906).
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2-WHm THz= Is A WUL-,-
(a) Gifts by a parent to a child prior to the execution of a
will are not advancements unless charged therein.
(b) Gifts after the execution of a will are presumed to be
in satisfaction of the legacies named In the will.
J. E. MBmRs.
EQUITY-EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF REAL
ESTATE-RISK OF LOSS.
In an executory contract for the sale of real estate upon whom is
the risk of loss between the date of execution of the contract and the
date of performance?
The first recorded decision upon this point was the English case
of Paine v. Meller,1 decided in 1801 and consistently followed in Eng-
land since that time. It is apparently followed by an overwhelming
weight of authority in this country?7 Although many eases have been
cited as contrary to this view yet a close analysis of them reveals that
in practically every instance there is some factual element which de-
prives the decision of the binding force of precedent. In fact, only
two cases have been found in which the court clearly placed the loss
upon the vendor in an action in equity.5 This view is supported to
some extent by Dean Pound,6 Keener,' and Pomeroy.8
16 Vesey Jr. 349.
325 Laws of England, p. 369, and cases cited thereunder.
3 See notes in 22 A. L. R. 575; 41 A. L. R. 1272; 46 A. I. R. 1126,
setting out the authorities. Also 27 R. C. L. 293 and 66 C. J. 811.
'Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 134 (1838), and Gould v.
Murch, 70 Me. 288 (1879), both oral contracts and unenforceable be-
cause of the Statute of Frauds, and both actions were at law. Phinizy
v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900) (containing dictum in
favor of equitable conversion), and Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. 229,
76 S. E. 698 (1912), the vendor-vendee relationship had not arisen due
to the non-performance of conditions precedent. Wells v. Calnan, 107
Mass. 514 (1871), and Powell v. Dayton Co., 16 Ore. 33, 16 Pac. 863
(1888), the actions were at law. In Cutliff v. McAnally, 88 Ala. 507,
512, 7 So. 331 (1889), there was only a weak dictum. Davidson v.
Ins. Co., 71 Ia. 532, 534, 22 N. W. 514 (1887), involved only the con-
struction of an insurance policy. Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 62
N. R. 244 (1902), and Bautz v. Kuhworth, 1 Mont. 133, 136 (1869),
were actions at law.
See Cockerill, Equitable Coversion, 1 So. Calif. L. Rev. 309 (1928),
where, after reviewing all the cases in California on this point, con-
cludes at page 325: "No criticism is intended to be made of the de-
cisions in the cases discussed. They are, it is believed, correctly de-
cided on their respective facts. The suggestion made is only that,
disregarding the loss, the vendor was not entitled in any of them to a
decree of specific performance. If this deduction be admitted the
doctrine of equitable conversion was in no wise involved."
5Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352 (1880); Appleton Electric Co. v.
Rogers, infra, note 13.
aProgress of the Law-Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 826-28 (1920).
"The Burden of Loss as an Incident to the Specific Performance
of a Contract," 1 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1901).
85 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), See. 2282 (1919).
